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CORPORATE LAWYERS:  ETHICAL AND 
PRACTICAL LAWYERING WITH VANISHING 
GATEKEEPER LIABILITY 
FOREWORD 
Marc I. Steinberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
I am pleased to author the introductory article for the Fordham Law 
Review’s insightful Colloquium focusing on the corporate attorney.  As the 
articles in this Colloquium illustrate, the role of the corporate lawyer—both 
as in-house and outside counsel—is instrumental in effectuating ethical 
lawyering, sound corporate governance practices, and law compliance.1  
These timely contributions that are summarized at a later point in this Article2 
comprise a valuable resource to assess the functions, obligations, and 
perceptions of the corporate attorney, as well as the public policy 
ramifications of counsel’s conduct. 
At least since the 1970s, the corporate lawyer’s instrumental role in 
shaping the client company’s culture and conduct has been a subject of 
analysis by courts,3 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),4 bar 
 
*  Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law; Director, SMU 
Dedman School of Law, Corporate Counsel Externship Program.  I thank Casey Fraser and 
Adrian Galvan, both members of the Texas Bar, for their significant contributions.  A number 
of the authors of articles from the Colloquium provided edits to descriptions of their respective 
contributions which I have incorporated herein. 
 
 1. For my law school text on this subject, see Marc I. Steinberg & Stephen B. Yeager, 
INSIDE COUNSEL:  PRACTICES, STRATEGIES, AND INSIGHTS (2d ed. 2020). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 
F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990); 
Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Conn. 
1987). 
 4. See, e.g., SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978); Carter 
& Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 1981 WL 384414 (Feb. 28, 1981); Hodgin, 
Exchange Act Release No. 16,225, Securities Act Release No. 6131, 18 SEC Docket 458 
(Sept. 27, 1979). 
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associations,5 and commentators.6  As exemplified by the articles in this 
Colloquium, this dialogue continues today, as traditional topics are revisited 
and new subjects are explored.  Nonetheless, one pressing development 
merits scrutiny:  although the multifaceted issues implicating corporate 
counsel remain vibrant, the specter of liability has dramatically decreased. 
For decades, corporate counsel has been characterized as a “gatekeeper.”7  
Serving in that capacity, the corporate attorney acts as the red or green light 
to the consummation of securities transactions as well as other endeavors 
sought to be undertaken by the client.8  This gatekeeper role remains intact 
today.9  However, what has fundamentally changed is the liability exposure 
for attorneys who fail—either negligently or knowingly—in performing this 
function.10  Hence, the key premise of this Article is that, while corporate 
counsel’s adherence to ethical norms comprises an important component of 
sound corporate governance and law compliance, failure to do so ordinarily 
does not incur attorney liability exposure.  The consequence, as the 
discussion in this Article’s next Part will address, is the vanishing of 
gatekeeper liability. 
I.  THE VANISHING OF GATEKEEPER LIABILITY 
It remains true that corporate attorneys continue to face liability exposure 
to their clients for malpractice11 and to nonclients when authoring opinion 
 
 5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.2, 1.6, 1.13, 1.16, 4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2018); see also ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992).  
See generally Report of the New York City Bar Association Task Force on the Lawyer’s Role 
in Corporate Governance, 62 BUS. LAW. 427 (2007); The Code of Professional Responsibility 
and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Practice—A Report by the Committee 
on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, 30 BUS. LAW. 1289 (1975). 
 6. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY LIABILITY AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY 
(Supp. 2018); Samuel H. Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers:  Disclosure, 
Responsibility, Liability to Investors, and National Student Marketing Corp., 54 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 795 (1979); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the Public 
Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423 (1978); Morgan Shipman, The Need 
for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal 
Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231 (1973). 
 7. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916 
(1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper:  An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1293 (2003); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of 
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). 
 8. See, e.g., Spectrum, 489 F.2d at 536; United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 
(2d Cir. 1964); Felts v. Nat’l Account Sys. Ass’ns, 469 F. Supp. 54, 59–60 (N.D. Miss. 1978); 
Gruenbaum, supra note 6, at 804. 
 9. See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 449 (2014) (“Emphasizing the 
importance of outside professionals as ‘gatekeepers who detect and deter fraud,’ the Senate 
Report concludes:  ‘Congress must reconsider the incentive system that has been set up that 
encourages accountants and lawyers who come across fraud in their work to remain silent.’” 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 10-146, at 2 (2002))). 
 10. See infra notes 44–122 and accompanying text. 
 11. See, e.g., RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (2019 ed.). 
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letters that are designed to be relied on by such third parties.12  Moreover, in 
certain instances, attorneys under state law may incur liability for fraud13 and 
for aiding and abetting violations of applicable state securities laws,14 as well 
as breaches of fiduciary duty or fraud committed by corporate fiduciaries 
(such as those perpetrated by directors and officers).15  Outside of these 
settings, in the performance of a corporate attorney’s customary tasks, the 
incurrence of liability is relatively rare.16 
The premise of this discussion is to illustrate that the liability of the 
corporate attorney to nonclients today is greatly diminished as compared to 
twenty-five years ago.17  This eventuality has been accentuated by the failure 
of the SEC to take meaningful action against miscreant corporate counsel 
who act solely in their advisory roles.18  Logically, one would conclude that 
the corporate attorney’s liability exposure would have become enhanced 
after the financial scandals of two decades ago and the 2008 financial crisis.19  
Surprisingly, the very opposite has occurred:  corporate counsel’s vanishing 
gatekeeper liability.20 
A.  Historical Perspective:  Corporate Attorney Liability as Gatekeeper 
The corporate counsel as gatekeeper is a fixture that has been entrenched 
for nearly half a century.21  Gatekeepers may be defined as follows: 
Gatekeepers are reputational intermediaries that, in the securities context, 
enhance market integrity by staking their reputation on the credibility of an 
investment [or other matter] through their certification, assessment, or 
verification of facts surrounding it.  Depending on the circumstances, 
gatekeepers have the ability to detect and deter fraud.  Gatekeeper 
reliability is thus an integral component of the integrity of the securities 
markets.22 
 
 12. See, e.g., Horizon Fin., F.A. v. Hansen, 791 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (applying 
Georgia and Pennsylvania law); Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. 
Rptr. 901 (Ct. App. 1976); Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996). 
 13. See, e.g., Lawson v. Cagle, 504 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 1987); Brownell v. Garber, 503 
N.W.2d 81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Veras Inv. Partners, LLC v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & 
Feld LLP, 851 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 2007)  
 14. See, e.g., Houston v. Seward & Kissel LLP, No. 07-cv-6305, 2008 WL 818745 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008) (allowing an aiding and abetting claim under Oregon securities 
fraud statutes to proceed). 
 15. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V, L.P. v. Mayer Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP, 
612 F. Supp. 2d 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying New York law). 
 16. See infra notes 44–122 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 44–122 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 85–97 and accompanying text. 
 19. See generally KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS:  A TRUE STORY (2005); 
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT:  INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010). 
 20. See infra notes 44–122 and accompanying text. 
 21. See generally Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014); Choi, supra note 7; 
Coffee, supra note 7; Kraakman, supra note 7. 
 22. Marc I. Steinberg & James Ames, From the Regulatory Abyss:  The Weakened 
Gatekeeping Incentives Under the Uniform Securities Act, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4–5 
(2016). 
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As the SEC observed in Fields,23 handed down in 1973, the securities 
attorney “works in his office where he prepares prospectuses, proxy 
statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the 
financial community, and the investing public must take on faith.”24  
Similarly, as the Second Circuit asserted that same year, “[e]ffective 
implementation of [the securities laws’] safeguards . . . depends in large 
measure on the members of the bar who serve in an advisory capacity to those 
engaged in securities transactions.”25  Hence, the corporate attorney’s 
function as gatekeeper has been a constant presence for several decades.26  
As broadly expressed by Fred Zacharias, “[l]awyers are gatekeepers and 
always have been.”27 
Consistent with this rationale, private and SEC actions against corporate 
lawyers based on noncompliance with their gatekeeping function occurred 
with regularity prior to the mid-1990s.28  With significant frequency, 
securities attorneys were sued as aiders and abettors in private actions under 
the key antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws—section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 193429 and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder.30  The SEC likewise invoked these provisions in numerous 
enforcement actions against attorneys.31  In addition, the commission utilized 
its Rule 2(e) disciplinary authority32 against legal counsel who allegedly 
 
 23. Securities Act Release No. 5404, 1973 WL 149285 (June 18, 1973). 
 24. Id. at *3 n.20. 
 25. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 26. See supra notes 7–9, 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 27. Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004); 
see Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2245 
(2004) (“By withholding his or her support (such as a lawyer’s opinion letter or an 
accountant’s certification), the professional gatekeeper may be able to prevent the fraud.”). 
 28. See generally Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991); SEC 
v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Spectrum, 489 F.2d 535; Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n 
v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990); SEC v. Elec. Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. 
Conn. 1988), aff’d, 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989); Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, 
Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 660 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Conn. 1987); Morgan v. Prudential Grp., Inc., 
527 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2018). 
 30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019); see supra notes 3, 28.  The merits of private securities 
litigation are succinctly set forth by Steven Ramirez: 
First, private enforcement operates in a depoliticized context . . . .  [R]obust private actions 
operate as a check upon the dangers of agency capture.  Second, private claims of securities 
fraud require no government bureaucracy or other government funding support, other than the 
routine operation of a court system . . . .  Third, only private litigation both strips the 
fraudfeasor of the benefits of their wrongdoing and compensates the victim . . . .  Fourth, 
private remedies allow a reduced reliance upon ex ante government regulation . . . .  Fifth, the 
broad definition of a security for purposes of the federal securities laws assures that virtually 
all financial transactions with the ability to disturb financial stability and macroeconomic 
conditions fall within the scope of the private remedy under Rule 10b-5. 
Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation:  An Historic and 
Macroeconomonic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 722–26 (2014). 
 31. See supra notes 3, 4, 8, 23, 25, 28. 
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).  Rule 2(e) was renumbered to Rule 102(e).  Pursuant to 
section 602 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Rule 102(e) was codified in significant part 
by adding section 4C(a) to the Securities Exchange Act. 
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engaged in unprofessional conduct when counseling their clients,33 seeking 
to suspend or bar these professionals from practicing before the SEC.34 
Of course, since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,35 attorneys 
are subject to liability under section 1136 for issuing materially false and 
misleading opinions that are contained in a registration statement.37  That 
remains true and represents a rare situation where an attorney realistically 
today may incur liability under the federal securities laws.38  In days of 
yesteryear, however, more expansive theories of attorney liability were 
advanced with some success, including that the defendant lawyer was a 
“seller” of the subject securities and, hence, liable under section 12 of the 
Securities Act39 to the affected purchasers based on a registration violation40 
or a material misstatement contained in an offering document.41  In addition, 
with some frequency, legal counsel was sought to be held liable as a control 
person of the primary violator.42 
The days of expansive attorney liability under the federal securities laws 
are gone.  Today, outside of section 11 liability, an attorney ordinarily incurs 
liability exposure only when she engages in blatant fraud, such as stock 
manipulation or insider trading.43  The following discussion focuses on this 
changed environment. 
B.  The Dissipating Liability Exposure of Corporate Counsel 
Beginning in 1994, the liability exposure of corporate counsel was 
significantly reduced due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Central 
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.44 that aider and 
abettor liability is impermissible in private actions under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.  That decision was followed by the enactment of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199545 (PSLRA). PSLRA, among other 
 
 33. See generally Gibson, Exchange Act Release No. 18,314, 1981 WL 28249 (Dec. 7, 
1981); Hodgin, Exchange Act Release No. 16,225, Securities Act Release No. 6131, 18 SEC 
Docket 458 (Sept. 27, 1979); Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 
15,982, 1979 WL 186370 (July 2, 1979). 
 34. See sources cited supra notes 4, 23, 33. 
 35. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77bbbb 
(2018)). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018). 
 37. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 38. See generally DONALD W. GLAZER ET AL., GLAZER AND FITZGIBBON ON LEGAL 
OPINIONS (3d ed. 2008 & Supp. 2018).  
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 771. 
 40. Id. § 771(a)(1); cf. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 629–630 (1988) (defining the term 
“seller” under section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).  See generally Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 1104 (5th 
Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 1914 (1989); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 
1349 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 42. See, e.g., In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Seidel v. 
Pub. Servs. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1342 (D.N.H. 1985). 
 43. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 44. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 45. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
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provisions,46 greatly enhanced the pleading requirements47 and precluded the 
undertaking of discovery, including the production of documents and witness 
testimony, until and unless the plaintiff hurdled a motion to dismiss.48  With 
these onerous pleading requirements, a large percentage of securities cases 
alleging fraud do not proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage.49  Not 
surprisingly, due in part to the absence of discovery and the presence of 
rigorous pleading mandates, lawyers today are rarely sued in private 
litigation alleging violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.50  This 
consequence is reinforced by the PSLRA’s limitation of liability to that of 
proportionate fault unless the subject defendant acts with actual knowledge 
of the fraudulent conduct.51 
Seeking to evade the strictures of the PSLRA, plaintiffs filed class actions 
in the state courts, predominantly in the California courts.52  Reacting to this 
attempt to vitiate the PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 199853 (SLUSA). With certain exceptions,54 
SLUSA mandates that securities class actions involving nationally traded 
 
 46. Other provisions, for example, include a safe harbor for forward-looking statements 
in private securities litigation, provisions addressing contribution and proportionate liability, 
and class action reform (such as selection of lead plaintiff). See generally JOHN T. BOSTELMAN 
ET AL., PUBLIC COMPANY DESKBOOK:  SARBANES-OXLEY AND FEDERAL GOVERNANCE 
REQUIREMENTS (2d ed. 2009). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1); see Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
308, 314 (2007) (interpreting the PSLRA’s pleading requirements to require a strong inference 
of fraudulent intent). 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
 49. See STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT 
TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:  2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 20 (2019), 
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2019/PUB_Year_End_Trends_012819
_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N62-678U] (“Out of the motions to dismiss for which a court 
decision was reached, the following three outcomes classify all of the decisions:  granted with 
or without prejudice (45%), granted in part and denied in part (30%), and denied (25%).”). 
 50. See Marc I. Steinberg, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims—Only Part of the Story, 45 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 603, 607 (2014) (stating that collateral actors, including attorneys, are rarely 
named as defendants in class actions). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A). 
 52. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006) 
(“Rather than face the obstacles set in their path by the Reform Act, plaintiffs and their 
representatives began bringing class actions under state law, often in state court.”).  See 
generally Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court:  The Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1999); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a 
False Alarm:  Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 53. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 54. Generally, individual actions, derivative suits, and actions alleging state law violations 
in the merger and acquisition context may continue to be brought in state court.  In addition, 
class actions alleging solely federal claims under the Securities Act (such as section 11 claims) 
may continue to be instituted in state court. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b), 77p(f), 78bb(f)(3); Cyan, 
Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).  As expected, the effect of Cyan 
is that plaintiffs increasingly are bringing their class actions alleging only federal Securities 
Act claims in state court. See Martin L. Seidel & Mary Eaton, The Supreme Court’s Cyan 
Decision:  Implications for Securities Class Actions, REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG., Apr. 
10, 2019, at 69, 71 (observing plaintiffs “flock[ing]” to state courts after Cyan). 
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securities must be brought in federal district court with only federal law 
applying.55  SLUSA thereby not only requires that these class actions be 
instituted in federal court but also precludes the filing of state law claims, 
including otherwise applicable state securities law claims as well as claims 
premised on breaches of fiduciary duty.56  This legislation thereby drastically 
reduces attorney liability exposure, as it forbids the bringing of otherwise 
meritorious state law claims.57 
Plaintiffs have tried, but thus far have failed, to allege that legal counsel 
who drafts a client’s materially misleading disclosure document or otherwise 
meaningfully renders advice with respect to the disclosure process is 
primarily liable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  This position initially 
was met with approbation by a number of courts, including the federal district 
court in the Enron litigation.58  Nonetheless, this approach ultimately failed 
before the Supreme Court.59  Rejecting a flexible “scheme to defraud” 
rationale,60 the Court held that plaintiffs must show that they had knowledge 
of and relied on the defendant’s alleged misconduct.61  Unless the subject 
law firm is identified in the disclosure documents or other materials provided 
to investors, proving reliance on the law firm’s allegedly improper conduct 
is problematic.62  And, of course, such fraudulent conduct must be 
sufficiently alleged without the availability of discovery.63 
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court further restricted primary 
liability under Rule 10b-5(b)64 by holding that this provision encompasses 
only those persons who “make” the subject material misstatement(s).65  
Construing the term “make” narrowly, the Court reasoned that the term is 
confined to those who have control over the contents of the subject 
statements and the manner in which such statements are disseminated.66  
 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1); Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 
(2014). 
 56. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82–89. 
 57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 58. Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 235 F. 
Supp. 2d 549, 610–11 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 59. See generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 
(2008). 
 60. Id. at 159–60 (“Invoking what some courts call ‘scheme liability,’ petitioner 
nonetheless seeks to impose liability on respondents even absent a public statement.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 61. Id. at 159 (“No member of the investing public had knowledge, either actual or 
presumed, of respondents’ deceptive acts during the relevant times.  Petitioner, as a result, 
cannot show reliance upon any of respondents’ actions . . . .”). 
 62. See generally Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 63. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2019). 
 65. See generally Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 
(2011). 
 66. Id. at 144 (stating that “the maker of a statement is the entity with authority over the 
content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it”). 
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Because attorneys rarely have such control, the decision provides another 
avenue for liability avoidance.67 
Lorenzo v. SEC,68 a more recent Supreme Court decision, may give 
plaintiffs a glimmer of hope.  In this SEC enforcement action, the Court held 
that people who disseminate materials knowing they contain disclosure 
deficiencies may be liable under specified antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws.69  However, applied to legal counsel, prudent attorneys 
decline to act as disseminators of their clients’ disclosure documents to 
investors.70  Moreover, even if an expansive “indirect” dissemination 
standard were to apply,71 plaintiffs ordinarily still must show that they knew 
of and relied on the conduct of the recalcitrant lawyer(s)—a challenging 
standard to satisfy.  In view of these Supreme Court decisions—precluding 
the application of aider liability in section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private 
actions, along with a narrow construction of primary actor status—corporate 
counsel’s liability exposure in federal securities class actions is minimal.72 
C.  The SEC’s Abstention in Disciplining Corporate Counsel 
The SEC has key weapons in its arsenal to use against alleged miscreant 
lawyers.73  For example, the SEC has statutory authority to bring 
enforcement actions against attorneys based on aiding and abetting violations 
of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.74  In its administrative enforcement 
proceedings, the SEC can pursue attorneys under its cease and desist 
authority for “causing” their clients’ misconduct.75  With respect to the 
SEC’s disciplinary authority, Rule 102(e) proceedings76 may be instituted 
against lawyers based on unethical conduct77 or actions premised on a breach 
 
 67. Thus, the decision signifies that attorneys ordinarily will be subject to Rule 10b-5(b) 
primary liability exposure only when they themselves “make” a statement, such as an attorney 
opinion letter or other communication conveyed to investors. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, 
Zox & Dun, 143 F.3d 263, 266–68 (6th Cir. 1998); Tr. Co. of La. v. N.N.P. Inc., 104 F.3d 
1478, 1490 (5th Cir. 1997); Kline v. First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 491 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 68. 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019). 
 69. Id. at 1100 (holding that persons who knowingly disseminate materially false or 
misleading statements may be subject to liability under section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)). 
 70. If counsel engages in such conduct, she incurs the risk of being a “participant” or 
“seller” in the transaction. Cf. Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 14 (Wash. 1990). 
 71. This argument may be based on the “direct or indirect” language of section 10(b). 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018). 
 72. The major exception to this proposition is if the attorney makes a statement, such as 
pursuant to an opinion letter or other communication to investors. See supra note 67 and 
accompanying text. 
 73. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE:  
FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2019–2020). 
 74. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e). 
 75. See, e.g., id. § 78u-3. 
 76. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 77. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 33. 
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of the SEC’s standards of professional conduct for attorneys.78  In addition, 
in the brokerage firm setting, enforcement actions may be brought based on 
a subject attorney’s alleged failure to adequately oversee a subordinate 
employee under such attorney’s supervision.79 
Thus, the SEC’s arsenal is impressive and was historically invoked against 
legal counsel with some frequency.80  Attorneys from “Wall Street” firms 
were sued by the SEC and law firms, at times, were named as defendants.81  
Today, however, unless engaged in palpably improper conduct, such as 
insider trading,82 stock manipulation,83 or the issuance of false opinion 
letters,84 enforcement actions against attorneys are rare.85  Although the SEC 
occasionally will name accounting firms as defendants,86 it declines to do so 
in regard to law firms.87  Perhaps most telling is that, since the adoption in 
 
 78. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities 
Act Release No. 8186, Exchange Act Release No. 47,282, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 79. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(E); Urban, Securities Act Release No. 66,259, 2012 WL 
1024025 (Jan. 26, 2012) (finding the general counsel of a brokerage firm not liable on a failure 
to supervise charge). 
 80. See STEINBERG, supra note 6, §§ 4:01–4:05 (collecting cases). 
 81. See generally Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 
1979 WL 186370 (July 2, 1979); Plotkin, Yolles, Siegel & Turner, Exchange Act Release No. 
5841, 1977 WL 175975 (July 5, 1977). 
 82. See generally SEC v. Levoff, No. 2:19-CV-05536 (filed D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2019); SEC 
v. Marks, No. 2-CV-12325 (D. Mass. filed Dec. 3, 2002); Wiest, Exchange Act Release No. 
72155, 2014 WL 1894492 (May 13, 2014). 
 83. Cf. SEC v. Zouvas, No. cv-17-00427, 2019 WL 4016687, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 26, 
2019) (alleging negligent involvement in a scheme to manipulate the market for the subject 
company’s stock). 
 84. See, e.g., SEC v. Atlas, No. 19-CV-62303 (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 17, 2019). 
 85. Occasionally, the SEC institutes enforcement actions against attorneys alleging other 
types of misconduct. See, e.g., SEC v. Heinen, No. C-07-2214 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 24, 2007) 
(alleging fraudulent backdating of stock options by attorneys); SEC v. Isselmann, No. CV-04-
1350 (D. Or. filed Sept. 21, 2004) (instituting proceedings alleging subject company’s general 
counsel did not provide key accounting information to the company’s audit committee, board 
of directors, or independent auditors); Google, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8523, 2005 
WL 82435 (Jan. 13, 2005) (instituting proceedings against Google and its attorney for alleged 
registration and disclosure violations).  Note that these actions occurred over a decade ago. 
See Monson, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,323, 2008 WL 2574441, at *5 (June 
30, 2008) (stating that “[a]s far as we are aware, we have not sanctioned attorneys in litigated 
enforcement proceedings based on alleged negligent acts or omissions they may have 
committed in providing non-public legal advice to clients” and also asserting that “the 
Commission has established that it will pursue cases against lawyers who allegedly violate the 
securities laws with scienter, render misleading opinions used in public disclosures, or engage 
in conduct that would render a non-lawyer liable for the same activity under comparable 
circumstances”). 
 86. See, e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 87,052, 2019 WL 
4596714 (Sept. 23, 2019) (announcing a settlement whereby an accounting firm did not admit 
wrongdoing involving the alleged auditor independence violations); Grant Thornton, LLP, 
Exchange Act Release No. 76,536, 2015 WL 7755463 (Dec. 2, 2015) (announcing a 
settlement whereby the accounting firm admitted wrongdoing in auditor independence 
violations). 
 87. Indeed, insofar as I am aware, the SEC has not named a “prestigious” law firm as a 
defendant since the 1980s. 
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2003 of its standards of professional conduct,88 mandated by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002,89 the SEC has not instituted a single proceeding against 
an attorney based on an alleged violation of these standards.90  Hence, for 
several years, the SEC has refused to invoke statutory and regulatory 
mechanisms that clearly come within the ambit of its authority.91 
The SEC’s lack of zeal in implementing its rightful authority is not 
confined to attorneys.  For example, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
the SEC elected to fine publicly held companies billions of dollars92 while 
declining to utilize the control person provision of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 193493—even on one occasion—to bring suit against corporate 
insiders, including chief executive officers and chief financial officers.94  As 
applied to the context of this Colloquium, the point is that, so long as 
corporate attorneys perform the “daily grist of the mill”95 and confine their 
role to the performance of legal services for their clients,96 the initiation of 
enforcement or disciplinary action by the SEC against corporate counsel is 
relatively remote.97 
D.  Corporate Counsel Liability Exposure Under State Law 
Unquestionably, corporate counsel’s greatest risk of liability is under state 
law.  For example, malpractice exposure to one’s client is a continual 
concern.98  In the opinion letter setting,99 counsel should be mindful of 
liability exposure to intended nonclient recipients based on negligent 
misrepresentation.100  In situations involving an alleged breach of fiduciary 
 
 88. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities 
Act Release No. 8186, Exchange Act Release No. 47,282, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205). 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2018). 
 90. I made this point in my recent book. See MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 278–82 (2018). 
 91. The SEC’s refusal to invoke clear provisions of the securities laws is not confined to 
the legal profession.  For example, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the SEC 
declined to pursue control persons (such as chief executive officers and chief financial 
officers) of major financial enterprises that paid hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions, 
in money penalties. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).  I have addressed this failure in a previous article. 
See Marc I. Steinberg & Forrest C. Roberts, Laxity at the Gates:  The SEC’s Neglect to Enforce 
Control Person Liability, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2017). 
 92. See, e.g., Steinberg & Roberts, supra note 91, at 217–28 (discussing proceedings). 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). 
 94. See Steinberg & Roberts, supra note 91, at 247 (asserting that “with respect to the ‘big 
players’ on Wall Street, the SEC has declined to pursue any individual liability at all, except 
on rare occasions”). 
 95. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dall., 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 96. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 651 (1988) (In ascertaining the definition of 
the term “seller” under section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1), the 
Supreme Court stated that application of a broad test “might expose securities professionals, 
such as accountants and lawyers, whose involvement is only the performance of their 
professional services [to liability].”). 
 97. See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
 98. See MALLEN, supra note 11 (collecting cases). 
 99. See generally GLAZER ET AL., supra note 38. 
 100. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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duty by corporate officers and directors, actions against corporate counsel 
premised on aiding and abetting occur with some frequency.101  As a last 
example, the state securities laws provide recourse against corporate lawyers 
who aid and abet their clients’ violations.102 
This seeming expansive presence of state law to redress alleged corporate 
counsel misconduct, however, is greatly exaggerated.  First, as discussed 
above, with few exceptions,103 state law does not apply to class actions 
involving nationally traded securities.104  Hence, absent a SLUSA exception, 
the state securities laws, as well as common law, are irrelevant in this 
setting.105  Second, although some states have broader provisions,106 the 
Uniform Securities Act107 (USA), adopted in some significant form by a 
majority of states,108 only encompasses in-house counsel who aids and abets 
a primary violation.109  Outside corporate counsel who engage in their 
customary professional roles thus are not within the provision’s reach.110  
Accordingly, under the USA, in-house and outside counsel can engage in 
identical improper conduct, yet only in-house counsel is subject to liability 
in private litigation.111  This clear gap in gatekeeper liability is antithetical to 
investor protection.112  Third, although corporate counsel may be subject to 
liability as aiders and abettors under state common law,113 such liability is 
predicated in many states on actual knowledge rather than reckless 
conduct.114  Proof of an attorney’s actual knowledge is frequently 
problematic.115  And last, in a small number of states, courts have invoked 
 
 101. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 102. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra note 54 for examples of these exceptions. 
 104. This consequence is due to the application of SLUSA. See supra notes 52–53 and 
accompanying text. 
 105. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 106. For example, Texas has an aider provision that encompasses any person who 
materially aids with reckless disregard of the truth. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-
33(F)(1) (West 2020). 
 107. Currently, there are three versions of the USA.  Evidently, the most widely adopted is 
the USA of 1956. See UNIF. SEC. ACT prefatory note (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 2002) 
 108. Some version of the USA has been adopted by approximately forty states. STEINBERG, 
supra note 6, § 5.03[1]; see also Marc I. Steinberg & Chris Claassen, Attorney Liability Under 
the State Securities Laws:  Landscapes and Minefields, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2005). 
 109. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410(b) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 
1956). 
 110. See, e.g., Bennett v. Durham, 683 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying Kentucky law). 
 111. To come within the scope of section 410(b), an attorney who materially aids must be 
an employee of the subject “seller.”  This provision thus encompasses in-house counsel but 
not outside law firms and their lawyers. 
 112. For elaboration on this subject, see Steinberg & Ames, supra note 22, at 39–47. 
 113. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 114. See generally Eurycleia Partners LP v. Seward Kissel, LLP, 910 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 
2009). 
 115. Nonetheless, state court actions against corporate attorneys occur with some 
frequency.  In a number of states, an attorney also may incur liability based on conspiracy.  
See, e.g., Siegmund v. Bian, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55725 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2018) (applying 
Florida law). 
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the attorney immunity doctrine to protect corporate counsel against claims 
brought against them by nonclients—even based on fraud and violations of 
the applicable state’s securities laws—so long as such counsel acted within 
the scope of client representation.116 
The inescapable conclusion is that state law remains pertinent in the 
corporate attorney context with respect to malpractice suits, actions by 
nonclients based on negligent misrepresentation, and individual actions in 
certain states based on fraud, as well as aider and abettor liability.117  
Otherwise, corporate attorney liability under state law largely is 
nonexistent.118  Moreover, generally, the state bar disciplinary authorities 
have lacked vigilance in holding miscreant lawyers accountable for their 
misconduct.119 
E.  The Lack of Accountability 
In view of the preceding discussion, one may logically conclude that 
although ethical precepts are plentiful with respect to the corporate attorney, 
relatively little meaningful enforcement currently exists.  The current lack of 
enforcement stands in marked contrast to the days of yesteryear when more 
rigorous standards were implemented in both private and government 
litigation.120  This absence of accountability has little bearing on the great 
majority of corporate lawyers who act with competence and integrity.121  But 
the absence of meaningful enforcement enables miscreant lawyers to 
perpetrate misdeeds upon investors and other affected persons who are 
without adequate redress.  This outcome is detrimental to investors, our 
securities markets, and the public’s perceptions of corporate attorneys. 122 
II.  THIS COLLOQUIUM’S ARTICLES 
In this Issue of the Fordham Law Review, timely contributions are 
authored by preeminent academicians focusing on the corporate lawyer.  The 
following discussion provides a succinct overview of each article. 
 
 116. See, e.g., Troice v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP., 921 F.3d 501, 507–08 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(applying Texas law).  For criticism of this broad immunity doctrine, see generally Marc I. 
Steinberg & Logan J. Weissler, The Litigation Privilege as a Shelter for Miscreant Legal 
Counsel, 97 OR. L. REV. 1 (2018). 
 117. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
 118. This is certainly true when the provisions of SLUSA apply. See supra notes 51–55 
and accompanying text. 
 119. See Steinberg & Weissler, supra note 116, at 44–45 (setting forth statistics regarding 
state disciplinary proceedings against attorneys and stating that “state bar associations have 
shown themselves hesitant to hold attorneys accountable for alleged misconduct”). 
 120. See supra notes 21–42 and accompanying text. 
 121. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1986) (“Lawyers, more than 
the members of any other profession, enjoy power, prestige, income, and the genuine affection 
of both clients and nonclients.”).  But see Megan Brenan, Nurses Keep Healthy Lead as 
Honest, Ethical Profession, GALLUP (Dec. 26, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/224639/ 
nurses-keep-healthy-lead-honest-ethical-profession.aspx [https://perma.cc/D8HU-4N6D] 
(ranking attorneys sixteenth out of twenty-two professions polled). 
 122. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, The Corporate/Securities Attorney as a “Moving 
Target”—Client Fraud Dilemmas, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2006). 
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A.  Miriam H. Baer:  “Compliance Elites” 
Professor Miriam H. Baer’s essay addresses the emergence of an elite 
cadre of lawyers increasingly attaining the positions of chief compliance 
officers (CCOs) at publicly held enterprises.123  She focuses on the positive 
aspects of this development, as well as the inherent drawbacks of a legal elite 
attaining the compliance seat.  The essay posits that, while this development 
is beneficial, there exist drawbacks due to the elite compliance officer’s 
“performance blind spots.”124 
Professor Baer’s essay contains three distinct discussions.  First, she 
highlights the impressive growth of the corporate world of compliance that 
is forecast to exceed $50 billion within the next five years.125  This growth 
has facilitated the emergence of elite attorneys serving as CCOs and 
consultants.126  Second, she addresses and synthesizes the positive aspects 
that accrue to corporations and other business enterprises that retain elite 
compliance personnel.127  Third, Professor Baer focuses on certain 
drawbacks of this development.128 
In theory, more talented professionals should result in more effective 
overall compliance.129  On the other hand, Professor Baer argues, precisely 
because the elite attorney has been such a superb performer throughout her 
career, she may not be the best compliance gatekeeper.130  Due to her high 
level of achievement, she may not be as apt to flag performance regimes 
whose characteristics (high pressure, high variability between hitting one’s 
targets and falling just shy of them) pose enhanced risks of unethical 
conduct.131  Because the elite attorney has always performed at a high level, 
she is unable to recognize the extent to which a high-stakes performance 
requirement induces cheating, fraud, corruption, or other hallmarks of 
noncompliance.  At the same time, the elite attorney may also be less primed 
to recognize performance that is just too good to be true.132  Collectively, 
these “performance blind spots” impede the elite lawyer from recognizing 
unethical behavior and from correcting the conditions that promote such 
behavior.133 
Professor Baer ends her essay with a recognition that compliance elites are 
here to stay.134  Recognizing this fact, she suggests that such elite CCOs and 
other compliance personnel engage in additional deliberation with an eye 
towards debiasing themselves of their blind spots.135  She theorizes as well 
 
 123. See generally Miriam H. Baer, Compliance Elites, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599 (2020). 
 124. Id. at 1602–05. 
 125. Id. at 1607. 
 126. Id. at 1607–14. 
 127. Id. at 1614–17. 
 128. Id. at 1617. 
 129. Id. at 1605–07. 
 130. Id. at 1623–25. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1624–25. 
 133. Id. at 1626–28. 
 134. Id. at 1629–30. 
 135. Id. at 1627–29. 
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that strong internal reporting programs that reward employee whistleblowers 
may be additionally valuable in alerting compliance personnel that their 
companies’ high achievers—and their high performance standards—merit a 
greater degree of skepticism and at least a second (or third) look.136 
B.  Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell & Aaron Stenz:  “Bad Agent, Good 
Citizen?” 
The next article by Professor Claire Hill, Professor Brett McDonnell, and 
Aaron Stenz focuses on the role of attorneys in client representation as good 
or bad agents, as well as good or bad citizens.137  The authors address the 
duties owed by an attorney as agent to her client and whether such attorney’s 
conduct makes her a good or bad citizen based on the positive or negative 
effects her advice has on society.138  The authors posit that attorneys have 
duties to society and that their advice may prove injurious to society 
irrespective of whether they act as good or bad agents.139  Accordingly, 
reconsideration of the attorney’s role is merited when a lawyer acts as a bad 
citizen even if she serves as a good agent to her client.140 
Within this framework, the authors describe four situations:  bad agent/bad 
citizen, bad agent/good citizen, good agent/bad citizen, and good agent/good 
citizen.141  Viewed generally, a bad agent is one who engages in self-serving 
conduct and whose services are not truly beneficial to the principal.142  In 
contrast, the good versus bad citizen distinction ascertains whether the 
agent’s actions serve a public interest.143  As an example, the authors discuss 
the bad agent/bad citizen attorney as one who initiates meritless lawsuits for 
their settlement or nuisance value with the primary objective of procuring 
attorney’s fees.144  Such cases provide little benefit to their clients and are 
detrimental to the subject business enterprises and, on a broader scale, 
society.145  As another example, with respect to the good agent/bad citizen 
situation, the authors describe an attorney who renders legal advice to her 
client that, while law compliant, violates the spirit of the law—such as an 
attorney who counsels a client to benefit from a regulatory loophole that 
exists due to legislative or regulatory inadvertence or new developments that 
make the loophole attractive to the client.146 
 
 136. Id. at 1628–29. 
 137. See generally Claire Hill et al., Bad Agent, Good Citizen?, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631 
(2020). 
 138. Id. at 1631–34. 
 139. Id. at 1631–32. 
 140. Id. at 1634. 
 141. Id. at 1633. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1632–33. 
 144. Id. at 1634–38. 
 145. To the extent that these actions facilitate enhanced standards of corporate governance 
and improve the quality of disclosures made to investors, my view is that they are beneficial 
to the corporation, shareholders, and society.  If these benefits eventuate, then it may be 
posited that the attorney is acting as a good agent as well as a good citizen. 
 146. Hill et al., supra note 137, at 1638–40. 
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Concerning the two remaining situations—bad agent/good citizen and 
good agent/good citizen—the authors provide the example of corporate 
directors and officers seeking to adhere to their obligations with respect to 
environmental law compliance.147  Counseling compliance with best 
practices that exceed minimal regulatory mandates may not serve the subject 
company’s best interests of profit maximization but nonetheless may portray 
the attorney as a good citizen.148  Moreover, if adherence to best practices 
indeed serves the company’s long-term best interests, such as by enhancing 
its reputation or deterring the promulgation of more onerous government 
regulation, the lawyer acts as both a good agent and a good citizen.149 
C.  Cathy Hwang:  “Value Creation by Transactional Associates” 
Professor Cathy Hwang’s article addresses a timely and thus far 
unexplored subject:  how transactional law firm associates bring value to 
deals.150  While a number of previous works have focused on the role of law 
firm partners in this context, there has not been examination of the value that 
transactional associates bring to the table.  In her article, Professor Hwang 
discusses the value-added functions that law firm associates perform in the 
transactional setting. 
As Professor Hwang discusses, functioning in their role as contract 
designers, law firm partners add value by enhancing the efficiency of the 
dealmaking process.151  The various contracts integral to a deal have many 
working parts, which normally are unbundled into simpler parts to increase 
efficiency.152  Transactional associates serve as conduits with respect to these 
unbundled moving parts.153  As conduits to this process, for example, 
associates must communicate with specialists (such as tax attorneys) who 
provide input for a specified aspect of the transaction.  Moreover, with many 
individuals simultaneously working on a subject transaction, different 
terminology and definitions in the drafting process are employed.154  It is the 
associate’s function to harmonize the final documents in a uniform and 
cohesive manner.  Hence, transactional associates act as conduits for multiple 
contract modules while also seeking to mitigate the limitations of modularity 
that arise.  Professor Hwang accordingly posits that not only do transactional 
associates add value but that this value is particularly meaningful.155 
 
 147. Id. at 1640–42. 
 148. Id. at 1641–42. 
 149. Id. at 1647–48. 
 150. See generally Cathy Hwang, Value Creation by Transactional Associates, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1649 (2020). 
 151. Id. at 1651. 
 152. For an earlier excellent article by Professor Hwang on this subject, see Cathy Hwang, 
Unbundled Bargains:  Multi-agreement Dealmaking in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (2016). 
 153. Hwang, supra note 150, at 1657. 
 154. Id. at 1659–61. 
 155. Id. at 1661. 
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Professor Hwang concludes her article by observing that, while concerns 
abound that automation will displace law firm associates, machines at this 
time cannot effectively replicate the associate’s function as a conduit for the 
effectuation of successful transactions.156  It is the transactional associates 
who can effectively reintegrate the many working parts of a deal into a 
cohesive framework.157 
D.  Sung Hui Kim:  “Economic Inequality, Access to Law, and Mandatory 
Arbitration Agreements:  A Comment on the Standard Conception of the 
Lawyer’s Role” 
In her article, Professor Sung Hui Kim argues that some of the leading 
defenses of the “standard conception of the lawyer’s role,” which combines 
the principles of partisanship and neutrality, cannot withstand the “economic 
inequality” objection—the objection that the moral praiseworthiness of the 
standard conception cannot be reconciled with a legal system that is so 
marred by gross economic inequality that only the wealthy have access to 
lawyers and the wealthy routinely use lawyers to undermine the public 
interest or to exploit others who cannot afford lawyers themselves.158  She 
reviews some of the leading defenses of the standard conception and its 
principle of neutrality that are grounded in the value of autonomy.159 
Although Professor Kim does not deny that some lawyers sometimes 
perform morally laudable work or that morally restricting the provision of 
legal services may impinge on the clients’ autonomy (in one sense), she 
argues that these attempts to universally defend the standard conception on 
autonomy grounds miss the mark.160  Their analyses lack appreciation for 
how the principle of neutrality all too often interacts with the reality of the 
disparate economic and bargaining strengths between the haves and the have-
nots to further exacerbate economic inequality.161  In particular, Professor 
Kim argues that the principle of neutrality, with its insistence on morally 
unrestricted lawyering, has operated in the employment context of large 
corporations to foreclose access to counsel for the have-nots.162  Specifically, 
this harm occurs through the widespread promulgation of predispute 
mandatory arbitration agreements, which—as a condition of employment—
compel employees to waive their entitlement to bring their employment-
related claims in court.163  Professor Kim argues that lawyers who adhere to 
the principle of neutrality and facilitate the imposition of these agreements 
on behalf of their employer-clients, are foreclosing employees’ access to 
 
 156. Id. at 1663. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See generally Sung Hui Kim, Economic Inequality, Access to Law, and Mandatory 
Arbitration Agreements:  A Comment on the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1665 (2020). 
 159. Id. at 1667. 
 160. Id. at 1669–74. 
 161. Id. at 1672–74. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 1674. 
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lawyers and the law and are undermining their autonomy.164  Therefore, such 
adherence impinges on the very value that the defenders of the standard 
conception claim to embrace.165 
E.  Donald C. Langevoort:  “Gatekeepers, Cultural Captives, or Knaves?:  
Corporate Lawyers Through Different Lenses” 
Professor Donald C. Langevoort’s essay focuses on two interesting 
issues.166  First, he addresses the process by which ethical apathy can 
overtake a corporate lawyer’s professional responsibilities.167  This part of 
the essay focuses on a particular aspect of the cognitive science relevant to 
lawyers caught “doing bad things”:  the element of consciousness being more 
of a continuum than either knowing or not having knowledge of the specific 
wrongdoing.168  This concept implicates the “slippery slope” of awareness, 
whereby an actor engages in a relatively minor transgression which he finds 
ways to rationalize.  Nonetheless, once this step is justified, it is now 
perceived as permissible and as constituting the new defined baseline.169  
Professor Langevoort posits that corporate attorneys are susceptible to the 
slippery slope.170  Seeking to solve their clients’ legal problems, attorneys 
may be incentivized to rationalize their conduct, making the slope even more 
slippery.171  Hence, the corporate lawyer may downplay the existence and 
significance of the ethical dilemmas presented until it is too late to extricate 
the client and himself from the situation.172 
Second, Professor Langevoort discusses the possible diminished interest 
in ethical gatekeeping.173  He explores how lucrative financial incentives 
may redirect a corporate counsel’s attention away from compliance to 
facilitating strategic business development.174  The ascension of the general 
counsel in prestige and status may serve to counteract this situation.175  With 
the backing of the company’s chief executive officer and board of directors 
that share this common objective, the general counsel may be poised to serve 
as an effective conduit to reawaken the lawyer-gatekeeper role for both in-
house and law firm attorneys.176 
 
 164. Id. at 1680–81. 
 165. Id. at 1680–82. 
 166. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Gatekeepers, Cultural Captives, or Knaves?:  
Corporate Lawyers Through Different Lenses, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683 (2020). 
 167. Id. at 1686–87. 
 168. Id. at 1687. 
 169. Id. at 1689. 
 170. Id. at 1692. 
 171. Id. 
 172. For an excellent article by Langevoort that applies social cognition research to 
corporate counsel’s professional responsibilities, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, Where 
Were the Lawyers?:  A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Client Fraud, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993). 
 173. Langevoort, supra note 166, at 1686. 
 174. Id. at 1695. 
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 176. Id. at 1696–97. 
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F.  Nancy J. Moore:  “Forming Start-Up Companies:  Who’s My Client?” 
Professor Nancy J. Moore addresses the ethical concerns of client 
identification prior to the formation of a business entity and explores the 
concept of entity representation prior to enterprise formation.177  In her 
article, Professor Moore analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the 
competing approaches.178  She concludes that the attorney should be held to 
represent one or more of the founders rather than the entity.179  Of course, 
such representation is subject to the ethical rules relating to the attorney as 
intermediary.180  And, in any event, it would be prudent for legal counsel to 
obtain an informed written agreement from the various constituents clearly 
identifying who the lawyer’s clients are.181 
As Professor Moore explains, when individuals approach an attorney to 
form a business entity, the question arises:  who is or are the client(s)—
namely, the individual founders, the nonexisting entity, or both the founders 
and the nonexisting entity?182  Other issues also presented include, for 
example, whether the lawyer continues to represent the founders after entity 
formation and who the lawyer represents if the entity in fact is never 
formed.183 
In her article, Professor Moore examines the retroactive and prospective 
theories of representation.184  The retroactive approach posits that the lawyer 
is deemed retroactively to represent the entity once it is formed, with the 
founders being neither former nor current clients of the lawyer.185  On the 
other hand, under the prospective approach, the attorney, with appropriate 
disclosures and consents, may represent solely the yet-to-be-formed 
enterprise.186  Neither of these approaches adequately addresses who the 
attorney represents if the entity in fact is never formed.  Rejecting both of 
these approaches, Professor Moore concludes that the lawyer should 
represent one or more of the founders.187  In this setting, counsel should 
identify and address any conflicts among the founders, obtain informed 
consent from each affected founder, and explain the material issues that 
impact their relationships once the entity is formed.188 
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G.  Nancy B. Rapoport:  “Using General Counsel to Set the Tone for Work 
in Large Chapter 11 Cases” 
Professor Nancy B. Rapoport’s article focuses on the role of a 
corporation’s general counsel in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy context—either 
the debtor’s general counsel or the general counsel of one of the creditors.189  
Bankruptcy is a complicated process involving many outside professionals.  
There is a disconnect between the objectives of a reorganizing business and 
those being paid, often lucratively, in their professional roles.  Who is best 
suited to keep these costs reasonable?  Professor Rapoport believes that a 
general counsel can encourage better behavior by stressing her billing 
values.190 
As Professor Rapoport explains, the way fees are paid in the Chapter 11 
context differs from other professional fees because they are paid either as a 
priority administrative expense (in other words, before general creditors get 
paid) or from a carve-out of a secured creditor’s collateral.191  Although the 
court must approve these fees and expenses, Professor Rapoport observes 
that these requests are ordinarily accepted.192  While some courts have 
become more proactive in overseeing this process, and although the larger 
cases often use fee examiners to assist the court’s review of fees, a company’s 
general counsel can also play a key role.  By expressing her views and values 
about professionals’ billing behavior, the general counsel can set a clear 
benchmark for reasonable fees and expenses.193  Although the Chapter 11 
process likely is unfamiliar to the general counsel, as the company’s highest-
ranking legal officer, she has a unique oversight opportunity to convey clear, 
values-based discussions with the outside professionals.194  By engaging in 
such dialogue, Professor Rapoport reasons that a general counsel can 
establish the foundation for a more cost-effective bankruptcy process.195 
H.  Omari Scott Simmons:  “Chief Legal Officer 5.0” 
Professor Omari Scott Simmons’s essay focuses on the contemporary role 
of the chief legal officer (CLO) in value creation.196  He focuses on three 
areas where the CLO creates value for the subject corporation:  (1) through 
sophisticated purchasing competencies with respect to the retention of and 
negotiation with outside legal service providers, including outside law firms; 
(2) by placing greater demands on in-house lawyers and to articulate the legal 
department’s value to corporate managers; and (3) by engaging in astute 
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global enterprise risk management and thereby having a positive impact on 
capturing and preserving economic value.197 
For example, as Professor Simmons observes, it is frequently the CLO’s 
responsibility to determine whether to purchase legal services from an 
outside legal service provider and to procure these services at the appropriate 
quality and cost.  Ascertaining the quality and cost of legal services, however, 
may present challenges.198  In this respect, the CLO provides value by taking 
measures such as mitigating the client’s information gaps, playing a key role 
in developing appropriate strategies, and determining whether the client 
should bundle legal services.199  With respect to outside legal service 
providers outside of the United States, Professor Simmons points to their 
increased use by general counsel when conducting business abroad due to 
their low-cost, high-volume work level.200 
The CLO, as Professor Simmons explains, provides an enhanced financial 
focus.  While some sources view legal departments as non-revenue 
generating, in actuality, the legal department generates revenue and the CLO 
should convey that reality to management.201  After all, value is created by 
mitigating transactional and litigation costs.  By wisely ascertaining which 
claims the corporation should pursue or by negotiating improved fee 
arrangements to better fit the company’s needs, the CLO is a value creator 
for the corporate enterprise.202 
Professor Simmons also focuses on the CLO’s enterprise risk-management 
function.  Understanding applicable law, business operations, and company 
culture, the CLO is well positioned to understand the risks that are 
presented.203  This understanding ultimately adds value for the corporation, 
as astute risk-management practices significantly enhance the corporation’s 
avoidance of liability exposure, government sanctions, and business 
disruptions.204 
I.  Eli Wald:  “Getting In and Out of the House:  The Worlds of In-House 
Counsel, Big Law, and Emerging Career Trajectories of In-House 
Lawyers” 
Professor Eli Wald’s article addresses the role and status of in-house 
lawyers over the past 150 years, the current symbiotic relationship between 
in-house counsel and Big Law, and the current career pathways both inside 
and outside the house.205  The article thoroughly examines the ever-evolving 
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role and opportunities available to in-house counsel, dating from the post–
Civil War era to the present.  Indeed, as Professor Wald explains, after the 
Civil War, old-school, in-house counsel were among the most highly 
compensated corporate employees who often were destined to become chief 
executive officers.206  This situation subsequently changed.  From the 1940s 
to the 1970s, with the professionalization of corporate management, as well 
as the increased dominance of prestigious large law firms, in-house counsel 
no longer fit the new corporate culture.207  The elite outside law firms 
assumed the new general counsel positions.  During the 1970s through the 
2000s, the pendulum swung back toward in-house counsel, who offered 
intimate inside knowledge of the corporation and its legal needs, as well as 
the promise of reduced legal costs.208 
Unlike prior periods, these new in-house counsel attended elite law schools 
and were previously employed and socialized at prestigious, large law firms.  
With no differing professional values or animosity existing between in-house 
and Big Law, a beneficial symbiotic relationship emerged.209  Professor 
Wald’s symbiotic account of the relationship between in-house and outside 
counsel thus rejects the standard story, pursuant to which in-house counsel 
triumphed over Big Law lawyers in a zero-sum game and replaced them as 
the main providers of corporate legal services.210 
Professor Wald’s contribution, however, goes beyond correcting the 
historical record.  Rather, his symbiotic model explains current, seemingly 
puzzling phenomena regarding corporate counsel, namely, the continued 
success of Big Law and the mixed record of in-house counsel exercising 
control over outside counsel.211  Because in-house counsel and Big Law 
depend on each other and in some instances offer complementary services as 
opposed to substitutes, the success of in-house attorneys is consistent with 
the continued success of large law firms and with sharing some power and 
control over corporate legal services with Big Law.212 
Perhaps of greatest interest to today’s practicing lawyers and law students 
is Professor Wald’s discussion of the dynamically changing career path 
opportunities that corporate lawyers now have available to them.  The 
symbiotic model reveals that rather than a one-way street exodus from Big 
Law to in-house departments, these avenues include moves from law firms 
to corporations, corporations to law firms, and from one corporation to 
another.  In this discussion, Professor Wald explains the varying challenges 
and opportunities available to inside counsel as well as the diversity and 
breadth of in-house practice.213 
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Interestingly, Professor Wald describes the motivating factors as to why a 
Big Law attorney may elect to move “in-house.”  The consequence is a 
commingling of the worlds of in-house and Big Law.214  With the experience 
of working with prestigious law firms permeating the in-house counsel’s 
role, Professor Wald identifies the blurring of these conceptual lines.  He 
concludes by discussing the possible adverse and positive impact that this 
development may have going forward on corporate law practice.215 
J.  David Yosifon, “Corporate Law as an Existential Project” 
In this first piece of a larger project, Professor David Yosifon discusses the 
existential significance of corporate law.216  The essay proposes corporate 
law as a model for personal ethics, thereby setting the foundation of corporate 
law as an existential project.217  But why corporate law?  Professor Yosifon 
reasons that humans yearn for meaning, but in modern society, the traditional 
suppliers of meaning are considered suspect.  Corporations, however, are 
inescapably present in our civilization.218 
In this essay, Professor Yosifon examines the law as a source of value and 
meaning, focusing on corporate law.  He explains this approach by thinking 
about life in terms of what generates feelings of engagement, interest, energy, 
and enthusiasm.  Through this lens, Professor Yosifon advances the idea that 
corporate law is a particularly powerful source of meaning to an existential 
project.219 
Professor Yosifon posits that this approach is supported by the backdrop 
of the corporation, found intriguing by many sources due to its combination 
of power and mystery.  These monolithic enterprises, and the corporate law 
that surrounds their existence, support his interpretation of that field in terms 
of its ability to move people toward a better life.220  Professor Yosifon 
examines these concepts from a number of perspectives, including law as a 
source of connection and the application of legal ethical rules and duties, 
such as the duty of loyalty that agents owe as fiduciaries to their principals 
(as exists in the attorney-client relationship).221  The essay encapsulates 
important yet challenging existential theories and applies them to attorneys 
seeking to find meaning in their practice of corporate law.  Professor Yosifon 
finds ample support that there indeed is a great deal of value to be derived 
from the practice of law, especially in the corporate context.222 
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CONCLUSION 
This important Colloquium Issue highlights the multifaceted functions, 
roles, and obligations of the corporate lawyer.  These insightful contributions 
should have a prominent stature in the scholarly literature focusing on this 
subject matter.  While a number of the articles are addressed principally to 
other academicians, others should prove useful as well to the practicing 
corporate lawyer.  This Issue accordingly has great breadth, encompassing 
both theoretical and practical topics, identifying important unresolved 
matters, and proffering concrete solutions to the dilemmas identified.  I thank 
the Fordham Law Review for inviting me to author the introductory article to 
this superb Colloquium Issue. 
